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One of the benefits of biofuel use is a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative to 
fossil fuels, but no policy directly targets carbon emissions across the full spectrum of renewable 
and nonrenewable  fuels. In light of  the political unpopularity of  carbon  taxes in the United 
States, we develop a model for a revenue neutral price instrument that maximizes social welfare 
subject  to  an exogenously  determined  net  tax  revenue  target. This  approach may  be  more 
palatable because it has the potential to change the relative price of the low-carbon and high-
carbon components of blended fuel while limiting increases in taxes and motor fuel prices. Our 
model shows that the targeted tax revenue level and share of output to total gross domestic 
product in all fuel sectors are important factors determining the revenue-neutral tax levels for 
each fuel type. Interestingly, we also find that the marginal damages of pollution are not the 
primary  determinants  of  the  revenue  neutral  price  instrument, but  instead  it  is  the relative 
marginal damages per unit price of each fuel type. This implies the counterintuitive possibility 
that with a revenue neutrality constraint, higher net carbon emitting fuels such as gasoline or 
diesel may implicitly be subsidized using revenues from carbon taxes on lower emitting fuels.
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Abstract
One of the benefits of biofuel use is a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative to 
fossil fuels, but no policy directly targets carbon emissions across the full spectrum of renewable 
and nonrenewable  fuels. In light of  the  political unpopularity of  carbon  taxes in the United 
States, we develop a model for a revenue neutral price instrument that maximizes social welfare 
subject  to  an exogenously  determined  net  tax  revenue  target. This  approach may  be  more 
palatable because it has the potential to change the relative price of the low-carbon and high-
carbon components of blended fuel while limiting increases in taxes and motor fuel prices. Our 
model shows that the targeted tax revenue level and share of output to total gross domestic 
product in all fuel sectors are important factors determining the revenue-neutral tax levels for 
each fuel type. Interestingly, we also find that the marginal damages of pollution are not the 
primary  determinants  of  the  revenue  neutral  price  instrument, but  instead  it  is  the relative 
marginal damages per unit price of each fuel type. This implies the counterintuitive possibility 
that with a revenue neutrality constraint, higher net carbon emitting fuels such as gasoline or 
diesel may implicitly be subsidized using revenues from carbon taxes on lower emitting fuels.
Keywords: Non-renewable resources, carbon tax, carbon dioxide emissions, revenue recycling, 
revenue neutral
JEL Classifications: Q32, Q54, D62, H212
1. Introduction
Two important issues regarding energy use have become prevalent: the development of 
alternative fuel sources to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and mitigation of greenhouse gases 
from fuel production and consumption.  Approximately 70-75% of carbon dioxide emissions are 
due to the combustion of fossil fuels (Halverson et al, 1989), and biofuels have been touted as a 
viable  alternative  to  fossil  fuels  for  lowering  carbon  emissions  from  combustion  engines.  
Although  there  is  substantial  debate  about  actual  and  potential  life-cycle  emissions  from 
biofuels, examples include corn ethanol that emits about 22% less greenhouse gas than gasoline
(Feng et al., 2008). Given the same energy equivalent from a coal power plant, poplar fed power 
plants  produce  approximately  5%  of  net  emissions  when  taking  into  account  the  carbon 
sequestration potential of trees during growth (Kline et al, 1998).
Generally, a carbon tax is often cited by economists as a means to address externalities 
associated with  carbon  dioxide emissions from fuel production and use (Tol 2005).  Welfare 
gains from  emission  taxes  are  significantly larger  than  other  policies  such  as  non-auctioned 
emission permits and quantity standards in the case of major industry innovations (Parry, 1998). 
However,  despite  the  efforts  of  a  number  of  high-profile  advocates  of  carbon  taxes,  many 
policymakers  see  the  implementation  of  a  carbon  tax  as  politically  infeasible  in  the  United 
States, especially in the short run.  There are several potential reasons for this distaste for carbon 
taxes, but two of them are likely to be a distaste for adding “yet another” clearly identifiable tax 
on taxpayers, and an increase in fuel prices (Gilbert 2008).
1
                                                
1 Another, perhaps more widely cited reason in the economics literature, is that taxes tend to be more costly to firms 
than quantity-based systems (McKibben and Wilcoxen 2002)3
In this paper we examine a policy option that has not received much attention that may be 
more politically palatable than a pure carbon tax: providing tax credits (subsidies) for low carbon 
fuels based on carbon emissions that are funded solely by carbon taxes on high carbon fuels.  To 
examine this possible policy alternative, we develop a model to maximize social welfare subject 
to an exogenously determined net tax revenue constraint. We derive the optimal market incentive 
instrument  that  internalizes  the  effects  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  given  a  net  revenue 
constraint and investigating the cost and benefits of such a policy. This revenue constraint may 
require no net increases in total fuel tax revenues such that all revenues from positive fuel carbon 
taxes are used to fund subsidies for other types of fuels.  Further, because the tax revenues from 
one blendstock are implicitly used to pay for the subsidy of another blendstock, the net price 
effect on blended motor fuel for a given content standard will be lower than a pure carbon tax. 
Policymakers and their constituents are likely to be more amenable to new tax structures when 
an increase in a tax in one sector is offset by a decrease in tax in another sector. 
One common approach for promoting biofuel production and use is the application of 
biofuel consumption and blend mandates.  The Federal Government is requiring an increasing 
level of consumption of renewable fuels ranging from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion 
gallons in 2022.
2  The 2008 consumption standard implies an estimated 7.76% renewable fuel 
content of motor fuels (EPA 2008) and the increase in the renewable fuel standards will lead to 
roughly 24% ethanol content in gasoline by 2022 (DOE/EIA 2008).
3   Such a mandate implicitly 
taxes fossil fuels and subsidizes renewable fuels through its upward pressure on the derived 
                                                
2 See The Energy Security and Independence Act of 2007;  available at
http://www.ethanol.org/pdf/contentmgmt/Full_Text_of_HR6.pdf
3 This is an approximation using the total ethanol supply estimates and the total motor gasoline consumption 
numbers (net of the ethanol estimate) from DOE/EIA (2008).4
demand for pure renewable fuel and downward pressure on the derived demand for fossil fuel 
(de Gorter and Just 2008).  Furthermore, the Energy Security and Independence Act imposes a 
requirement that an increasing fraction of renewable fuels be comprised of advanced biofuels 
based on biomass and alternative feedstock types.
Even though carbon emissions reduction is often touted as a potential benefit of biofuel 
use, no state or federal policies to date directly target the carbon emission characteristics of 
biofuels. California is developing a Low Carbon Fuel Standard, which requires fuel producers to 
satisfy a maximum average carbon intensity limit per unit of fuel sold, and other states are now 
considering this approach as well.  British Columbia has imposed a carbon tax on fossil fuels, but 
biofuels are exempt.
Subsidies  for  biofuel  production  have  been  broadly  applied  by  the  federal  and  state 
governments  in  the  United  States.  Government  subsidies  to  biofuel  production  have  been 
justified for at least two reasons: changing the relative price of motor fuels to favor renewable 
fuels  with  lower  carbon  emissions  and  reduction  of  dependence  on  fossil  fuels  through 
technological innovations.  Subsidies that help technological innovation in biofuel production 
and mitigation of greenhouse gases are commonly applied at both the state and federal level, and 
help decrease renewable fuel production costs while improving economic viability of biofuels in 
the long run.
4
The  revenue  recycling  literature  has  shown  the  potential  of  further  reducing  market 
imperfections by using pollution revenues to lessen distortions from taxes in other sectors (Parry, 
1995,  Parry  1997,  Bovenberg  and  Mooji  1994).  The literature  focuses on  the  imposition  of 
                                                
4 Historically, however, these subsidies for biofuels are funded from general tax funds.  The result is that blended 
fuel prices will decline relative to having no subsidy, and taxpayers in general pay from the subsidy rather than fuel 
users, and blended fuel consumption could likely increase.5
pollution taxes to correct for market externalities and using the revenues to decrease employment 
or income taxes, leading to higher marginal value of labor productivity and after-tax income. For 
example, British Columbia’s carbon tax program is designed to be revenue neutral in that the 
carbon tax revenues from fossil fuels are used to fund reductions in income and other taxes.
5 Our 
conceptual framework is similar, but with a focus on the fuel sector by deriving the optimal tax 
structure that corrects for the pollution externality while meeting a tax revenue target.
Applying the proposed revenue-neutral price instrument has the potential to avoid some 
of  the  drawbacks  of  quantity  control  instruments  such  as  fuel  content  standards. Price 
instruments  versus  quantity  instruments  have  been  studied to  determine  the optimal policy 
yielding the  better welfare outcome (Weitzman  1974). Several authors  have determined that 
price incentives offer the higher welfare results than quantity instruments in dealing with global 
climate change problems (Fischer and Newell 2008, Parry and Pizer 2007, Newell and Pizer 
2003, Hoel and Karp 2002, Pizer 2002, McKibbin and Wilcoxon 1997). In this regard, carbon 
taxes have been touted as a means of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
We  develop  a multi-sector model  representing varying  fuel  types.  Fuel  sectors  are 
connected through their contribution to accumulated atmospheric carbon dioxide from emissions 
and sequestration during  the lifecycle of fuel production and consumption.  A social  planner 
selects a carbon tax/subsidy schedule to reduce carbon emissions while constraining pollution tax 
revenues to be revenue neutral.
                                                
5 British Columbia’s system does not incentivize life-cycle carbon emission reduction of biofuels because biofuels 
are exempt from the carbon tax, and no carbon-indexed tax credits are provided for biofuels either based on the 
carbon tax or from general funds. See British Columbia Ministry of Small Business and Revenue. 2008 at 
http://www.sbr.gov.bc.ca/documents_library/notices/BC_Carbon_Tax_Update.pdf.6
We find that a social planner imposes standard a carbon tax rate that is increasing in 
emissions level when unconstrained by budgetary factors. If a revenue neutrality constraint is 
imposed, three important factors determine the tax structure: total tax revenue target, share of 
output to total Gross Domestic Product from all fuels, and the relative marginal damages from 
pollution per unit price of the good. When the exogenous net tax revenue target is lower, the 
constrained tax rates are also lower. The proportion of output to total Gross Domestic Product 
from  all  fuels  affects  the  magnitude of  the  policy. Interestingly,  we  also  find  that  relative 
marginal  damages  per  unit  price,  and  not  just  marginal  damages,  determine  the  sign  and 
magnitude of the pollution tax. In fact, under some circumstances, high carbon-emitting fuel 
types may be faced with a lower tax or even subsidized if their output price is significantly larger 
than low-carbon fuel types.
The rest of the article is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 provides simulations given various fuel types. Section 4 summarizes the results of the 
study and enumerates future directions of the study.
2. Pollution tax model for multiple fuel types
We assume that the economy is composed of three sectors: a fossil fuel sector (F), a 
biofuel sector (B) and a clean sector (C). Firms in each sector produce output according to a 
production function of the form:
( , ) , , i i ij ij y y K L i B F C   
where Kij and Lij are capital and labor in sector i allocated by the jth firm. Each jth firm in sector
i maximize profit, ij, by optimally selecting capital and labor,7
( ) ( , ) , ij i i i ij ij ij ij p t y K L wL rK i B F       
where  w and  r are  endogenously  determined  input  price  of labor  and  capital,  respectively. 
Producers receive a net price equivalent to the gross price of the fuel, pi, in each sector minus a
pollution tax, ti, for each output sold in the market. The clean sector is considered the numeraire 
good and faces a similar profit maximizing problem without a pollution tax. Firms in the clean
sector are not taxed since we assume that pollution is not a by-product during the production or 
consumption of the clean final good. 
We assume that capital in each sector is quasi-fixed but labor is allowed to move between 
the three sectors of the economy.
6 The revenue function in each sector i=B,F can be written as:
,
[ , , , , , ] max (( ) ( , ) ): ; .
ij ij
i i i k k i i i ij ij ij ij ij ij K L
j j j
R p t p t K L p t y K L wL rK K K L L i k
             
      
where K and  L are total  capital and labor endowments, respectively, in  the economy and a 
subscript k implies an alternative sector from sector i. Total gross domestic product, G, in the 
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where 
*( , , , , , , ) i B B F F C y p t p t p K L is the indirect production function in sector i. Here, production 
in sector i is increasing in its own price, pi, tax in the other sector, tk, and input endowments K
and L. Total tax revenues, T, are equal to the total output produced in each sector multiplied by 
                                                
6 We assume perfect substitutability of labor skills across sectors. Relaxing the degree in which labor is substitutable 
across sectors adds to the complexity of the model by allowing for a vector of wages corresponding to a vector of 
labor skills. However, this does not change the qualitative results of our model.8
the  tax  rate  such  that 
*
,
( , , , , , , ) i i B B F F C
B F
T t y p t p t p K L  .  We  consider  the  case  where  T is 
endogenously determined in the economy and when it is exogenously determined by an agent.
Total  pollution  in  the  economy  is  dependent  on  total  production  of  fossil  fuel  and 
biofuel. Total carbon emissions, E, are equal to
*
,
( , , , , , , ) i i B B F F C
B F
E e y p t p t p K L  ,
where ei is net carbon emissions rate from output in the sector. We assume that total net carbon 
emissions during the production and consumption cycle of fossil fuels are greater than biofuels, 
eF>eB. It is may also be likely that net carbon emissions from different biofuel feedstocks are 
less than zero given the carbon sequestration potential during the growth process of feedstocks 
such as wood. We do not assume that eB < 0 but we do allow for this potential to occur.
All consumers in the economy receive utility from gross domestic product but disutility 
from the  flow  of  carbon  emissions.  The  indirect  utility  function,  V,  representing  aggregate 
consumer welfare is quasilinear and written as
( ) V U G E    ,
where  ) (G U is the aggregate utility derived from gross domestic product and  is the marginal 
disutility  from  total  carbon  emissions.  We  assume  that  utility  is  concave in  gross  domestic 
product.  Marginal disutility from carbon emissions may differ depending on the geographical 
location of consumers but we assume that they are the same for all agents. 
2.1. Pollution tax with endogenously determined tax revenues
In the baseline case, we assume that the government chooses taxes to internalize the 
effect of the externality from firms in each sector without any constraints on the tax instrument. 
The  objective  of  the  government  is  to  maximize  aggregate  consumer  welfare  by  optimally 9
determining tax rates in each sector subject to private sector behavior  in the fossil fuel and 
biofuel sectors, production possibilities and fixed gross prices. The utility from reinvestment of 
carbon tax revenues is taken into account and the target of the reinvestment is unconstrained.  
We can write the government’s problem as
(1) 
, max ( )
F B t t V U G E    .
The first order conditions yields
(2) 
* * * *
* '( ) 0 ,
i i k i k
i i k i k
i i i i i i
dR dy dy dy dy V
U G y t t e e i F B
t dt dt dt dt dt

    
                 
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Expression  (3) can  be  interpreted  as  a  standard  Pigouvian carbon  tax equal  to  the 
marginal damages  from  the  production  of  fuel in  each sector.  Since  we assume  that  eF>eB, 
Pigouvian taxes for fossil fuels are higher than  for biofuels. If net carbon emissions from a 
particular biofuel are negative, a subsidy for biofuels would be instituted to maximize welfare.
We  illustrate  the  optimal  Pigouvian  tax  combination  in  tax  space in  Figure  1.  The 
indirect  utility  function  from  gross  domestic  product,  U(G),  is  quasiconvex  in  taxes.  Lower 
contour levels of U(G) represent higher utility. Total carbon emissions, E, can also be drawn in 
the space. Here, we find that higher contour sets of E imply lower carbon emissions levels since 
higher tax rates decrease output levels and, subsequently, emission levels. The point of tangency 
shows the optimal tax revenue, T*, that maximize utility of the economy. Thus, the tangency 
between U(G) and E illustrates the optimal Pigouvian taxes in both sectors. 10
The model can be extended to account for more than two fuel types. Each fuel type can 
be considered a separate sector in the economy. Without any restrictions on the tax structure, it is 
easy to show that the optimal Pigouvian taxes are chosen similar to (3). Here, we find that as 
taxes  are  increased  in  the  fuels  sector,  labor  is  reallocated  across  sectors  until  the  value  of 
marginal product of labor across all sectors are equal. Since the clean sector is not taxed, we 
would expect relatively more labor to enter into the clean sector once the government imposes 
the optimal Pigouvian pollution tax.
2.2. Pollution tax with exogenously determined net tax revenue constraint
We turn to the case where the government institutes pollution taxes subject to a revenue 
neutral  constraint.  A  general  revenue  neutrality constraint for  a  fixed  total  net  revenue
* *














t   . A more specific form of this constraint is when net 







t t   .  
The government’s objective function in this case remains the same as (1) but now we 
constrain taxes to a predetermined tax revenue level, T. We write the government’s problem as,
(4) 
, max ( )
F B t t V U G E      s.t.
* *
F F B B T t y t y   .
The corresponding Lagrangian function is
(5) 
* *
, max ( ) ( )
F B
F F B B t t L U G E T t y t y        ,
where   is  the  Lagrange  multiplier and  is  interpreted  as  the  marginal  utility  from  the 
predetermined net tax revenue level, T.  The first order conditions are 11
(6) 
* * * * * *
* * '( ) 0
i i k i k i k
i i k i k i i k
i i i i i i i i
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U G y t t e e y t t i k
t dt dt dt dt dt dt dt
 
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* * 0 F F B B
L
T t y t y


   

.
Simultaneously solving for the constrained taxes and optimal ,
c




















   









is the marginal rate of transformation between the output in the two sectors of the 
economy (see  Appendix  1).  The  denominator  is  positive  since  the  marginal  rate  of 
transformation is negative and marginal utility from gross domestic product is positive. If total 
tax revenue targets are aimed to raise revenues, pollution taxes are likely to be positive. In fact, 
revenue-neutral pollution tax is increasing in the total tax revenue target T. If total tax revenues 
are constrained to zero and output prices are equal, the fuel type with higher marginal damages 
will have a positive tax rate while the other fuel type will need to be subsidized.
Figure  2  illustrates  the  constrained  taxes  in  each  sector when  total  tax  revenues  are 
constrained to zero. Using the contour sets for U(G) and E, a constraint of total tax revenue to 
T’=0 implies U(G) and E are tangent at tF
c and tB
c.  In this case, since we have assumed that 
fossil fuel net emissions are larger than biofuels and output prices are equal, the former will be 
taxed a positive amount while the latter is subsidized. 
To understand the important factors determining optimal pollution tax levels when net tax 
revenues from the policy are equal to zero, we manipulate (8). In equilibrium, the marginal rate 12
of transformation (slope of the production possibility frontier) is equal to the ratio of output 

















































k k i i
p y




If total tax revenues are targeted to be zero, two factors determine the value of the constrained 
tax: the share of output in a fuel sector to total gross domestic product and the relative marginal 
damages per unit price from fuel use. The share of output to total Gross Domestic Product does 
not determine the sign of the tax. However, it serves to augment or reduce the value of the tax or 
subsidy imposed since a larger share of output increases the value of the policy. To determine the 
sign of the tax, one would need to compare the relative marginal damages per unit price from a 
good. We find that if the marginal damage per unit price of good i is larger than that of good k, 
i.e.  / /
u u
i i k k t p t p  , good i needs to be taxed more. We find an important result: the difference 
between marginal  damages  per  unit  price of  fuels  (not  just  marginal  damages) determines
optimal revenue-neutral pollution taxes. 13
The  reason  that  the  optimal  revenue-neutral  tax  is  dependent  in  part  on  prices  is  as 
follows.  Because net tax revenue is fixed, a tradeoff in setting the optimal revenue-neutral tax 
occurs between the change in value of production among each of the taxed industries and a 
reduction in emissions. The higher the value of output due to a higher relative output price in a 
sector, the higher  the  opportunity  cost  of  reducing emissions in  that  sector relative  to other 
sectors,  ceteris  paribus.    Thus,  the  welfare  gains  from  increasing  the  tax  rate  to  internalize 
emissions externalities are weighted by the respective prices in a sector.
This result implies a few important points.  First, optimal revenue neutral taxes vary as 
prices and output levels change even if the optimal Pigouvian tax remains constant. This is a 
potentially important complication for implementing such a tax structure and has implications for 
economic welfare. Second, to maximize social welfare it would be possible to impose a lower 
pollution tax on a fuel with a high net coefficient of carbon emissions compared to a fuel with 
low net carbon emissions if the price of the output of the former is many times higher than the 
latter in order. We discuss these issues in the next section.  
As with the Pigouvian tax structure, the model with an exogenous tax revenue constraint 
can be extended to include multiple fuel types. With N fuel types, we can generalize the problem 
of the government as
(4’) 
1,..., max ( )





T t y  .
The corresponding first order conditions from (4’) are,
(6’) 
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Simultaneously solving for N pollution taxes and  using N expressions similar to (6’) 
along  with  (7’)  will  yield  the  optimal  the  constrained  tax  levels  in  each  sector.  Given  the 
complexity of the solution, we turn to numerical simulations to describe the results of the model 
in a multi-fuel setting.
3. Simulated pollution taxes for multiple fuel types
We apply this model in the presence of five different fuel types: gasoline, diesel, corn 
ethanol, cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel. We impose a set of assumptions about net greenhouse 
gas emissions for each of these fuel types that are roughly consistent with the current literature.
7
Gasoline and diesel are petroleum based and considered to have higher net carbon emissions than 
the other fuel types. Corn ethanol and biodiesel are considered “first generation” biofuels with 
relatively lower net carbon emission than gasoline or biodiesel. Cellulosic ethanol is considered a
“second generation” biofuel that can be derived from plants, agricultural residues, wood and 
wood residues, among other sources.
8 Carbon emissions from cellulosic ethanol are assumed 
here to be lower than corn ethanol or biodiesel. Based on these and other assumptions developed 
below,  we  simulate the  unconstrained  and  tax  revenue-constrained  pollution  taxes  and  their 
welfare implications for the economy under several scenarios.
3.1. Parameters and functional forms
                                                
7 It is worth reiterating here, that the science behind estimating life –cycle net greenhouse gas emissions for biofuels 
is currently contentious and unsettled. We use the available estimates in the literature for our simulations.
8 The relative standings in carbon emissions is based on analysis of processes that have developed in markets that do 
not directly impose  a charge on carbon. It is not clear how the relative emissions reductions of these types of 
biofuels would change if a carbon tax or subsidy were imposed.15
The revenue function and utility function are needed to calculate optimal pollution taxes.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that utility is linear in gross domestic product. This would 
imply that the marginal utility of GDP is constant and we set it equal to 1. The production 
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas and quasi-fixed capital is normalized to 1 such that
, ,
i
i ij y L i B F C
    ,
where i is the input elasticity of labor. In equilibrium, the value of marginal products across all 
sectors are equalized such that
1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ...
i k c
i i i i k k k k c c c p t L p t L p L
     
        ,
where i and k represent sectors that emit carbon dioxide and sector c is the clean sector. Using 
the equilibrium condition along with the labor constraint, i
i
L L   , we want to solve for the 
optimal level of labor in each sector of the economy. To obtain a simple closed form solution, we
assume that input elasticities across sectors are equal. Algebraic manipulation shows that for any 
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.
In  this  specification, there  are  N  fuel  sectors  emitting  carbon  dioxide  and  one  clean 
sector. Here, revenue is  increasing in own prices and pollution taxes from other sectors but 
decreasing in prices of other fuels and own taxes.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters for emissions coefficient of various fuels and prices 
from  studies  in  the  literature.  Cellulosic  ethanol  is  a  new  fuel  which  has  not  been  fully 
developed. For the meantime, we assume that the price of this fuel source is the same as corn 16
ethanol. Estimates for emissions coefficient for cellulosic ethanol range from the same level as 
corn ethanol to 10% of corn ethanol emissions (Farrell et al. 2006). We calculate pollution taxes 
across a range of emissions coefficients. In estimating marginal damages from pollution, we start 
with the average market price of long term carbon sequestered at $20 / ton of carbon and convert 
it to utils per kilogram.
9
3.2. Simulation Results
Table  2  summarizes  pollution  taxes  with  and  without  tax  revenue  constraints.
Unconstrained  Pigouvian  taxes  range  from  $0.048/gal  for  biodiesel  to  $0.088/gal  for  diesel. 
Since all net emissions are positive for the five fuel types, marginal damages from fossil fuel use 
are positive leading to positive taxes. If we assume that the government imposes net tax revenue 
equal to zero across all fuel types and output prices are equal, we find that the ranking of carbon 
taxes across fuels are based on the emissions level. Diesel has the highest carbon tax at $0.018/ 
gal and two fuel types, cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel, are subsidized most at $0.016/gal and 
$0.024/gal, respectively.
When prices of fuel types are allowed to vary based on market prices in Table 1, only 
biodiesel is subsidized and we now find that ethanol has the highest pollution tax at $0.041/gal 
while diesel is third highest at $0.027/gal. The main reason why this result occurs is because of 
the difference between relative marginal damages per unit price between ethanol and gasoline. 
Even though marginal damages from gasoline is $0.004/gal more than ethanol, the output price 
of ethanol is 31% lower than gasoline. Thus, the marginal damages per unit price of ethanol are 
actually  higher  than  that  of  gasoline and  should  be  taxed  more  given  our  revenue  neutral 
                                                
9 See Table 1 for more detail in the calculation of marginal disutility from pollution.17
constraint. Only biodiesel should be subsidized while the four other fuel types should be taxed to 
maximize social welfare.
This outcome is highlighted if we take into consideration the upward trend of gasoline 
and diesel prices during the summer months. Assuming output prices for gasoline and biodiesel 
of $4 and $5 per gallon, respectively, we find that gasoline pollution taxes lower to $0.004 and 
diesel is now subsidized at $0.011 per gallon given the revenue neutral constraint. Again, this is 
due to the difference in relative marginal damages per unit price across fuel types.
Given the  uncertainty  in  emissions  coefficient  for  cellulosic  ethanol,  we  vary  the 
parameter. When we decrease the emissions coefficients for cellulosic ethanol to half of corn 
ethanol, a subsidy is imposed on cellulosic ethanol instead of a tax, under the revenue neutral tax 
structure. To subsidize production of cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel, taxes for ethanol, gasoline 
and diesel need to be increased. If the actual emissions coefficient is only 10% of corn ethanol 
emissions, the subsidy for cellulosic ethanol increases and taxes  on corn ethanol, diesel and 
gasoline continue to increase to maximize social welfare.
Table  3  provides  a  comparison  of  the  welfare  outcomes  of  the  different  policy 
approaches. In this model, the optimal unconstrained Pigouvian Tax provides the highest welfare 
while the lowest welfare is received when emissions taxes are not imposed. We normalize the 
highest potential change in welfare with the unconstrained Pigouvian tax from the no tax case as 
a 100% gain in welfare. The intermediate welfare outcomes are calculated as the percentage gain 
in welfare from the no tax case relative to the maximum welfare gain.  That is, the formula for 
the intermediate welfare percentage gains, Wi, is Wi=100*(Ui-Umin)/(Umax-Umin), where Ui, Umin 
and Umax are the utility derived from the intermediate policy case, unconstrained Pigouvian Tax  
and no tax case, respectively.18
   The  revenue  neutral  tax  provides  welfare  increases  equivalent  to  89%  of  the 
improvement with an optimal unconstrained Pigouvian tax. Thus, although the revenue neutral 
tax does not increase welfare as much as the first best policy, it contributes significantly to total 
welfare relative to the no tax case. In contrast, we measure the welfare gains in the case that the 
application of the revenue neutral tax is based on relative emissions alone rather than the price-
weighted relative emissions as indicated by the optimal revenue neutral tax. This implies that we 
assume  output  prices  are  the  same  resulting  in  a  modified  revenue  neutral  tax,  ti




u)k because prices cancel. The resulting revenue neutral taxes would 
increase welfare by 44% relative to the optimal Pigouvian tax. The increase in welfare is less 
than half of the welfare gains with revenue neutral taxes based on the marginal damages per unit 
price. This highlights the importance of using relative marginal damages per unit price and not 
just marginal damages in determining the optimal revenue neutral tax.
The optimal revenue-neutral policy requires varying revenue-neutral taxes when output 
prices or emissions coefficient change. Given the inflexible nature of legislated taxes and the 
difficulties measuring net carbon emissions, we investigate two cases: one in which output prices 
change but the tax is not optimally adjusted, and another in which an inaccurate estimate of 
relative emissions for one of the fuels is used. If we assume that gasoline and diesel prices rise to 
$4 and $5 per gallon respectively, but revenue neutral taxes remain in the same level as in the 
previous case, welfare gains are 23% relative to the optimal Pigouvian tax. This is substantially 
lower than the 89% gain in welfare from revenue neutral taxes with corrected market prices but it 
is important to note that welfare gains still occur. 
Suppose  now  that  the actual  emissions  coefficient  of one  fuel, cellulosic  ethanol, is 
actually lower  than  the  estimate used  to  calculate  the  revenue-neutral  tax.  If  the  emissions 19
coefficient for this fuel is 10% of corn ethanol but the revenue neutral tax is calculated based on 
our original estimates where cellulosic ethanol emits 70% of corn ethanol, the gain in welfare is 
only 63% of optimal unconstrained Pigouvian tax policy. Interestingly, if Pigouvian taxes were 
not allowed to adjust for the actual emissions rate, welfare gains would only yield 72% relative 
to  the  optimal  unconstrained  Pigouvian  tax  policy.  Thus,  welfare  efficiency gains  with  the 
revenue neutral tax policy is fairly close to the unadjusted Pigouvian tax policy.
4. Conclusion
The objective of this article is to derive the optimal market incentive instrument that 
internalizes  the  effects  of  greenhouse  gas emissions  and  satisfies  a more  politically  feasible 
revenue neutral constraint. We find that the targeted tax revenue level, share of output to total 
gross domestic product in all fuel sectors and relative marginal damages per unit price of each 
fuel type are important factors determining the revenue-neutral tax levels for each fuel type. 
Although the mechanism is second-best to pure carbon taxes except in special cases, this 
approach has the potential for being more politically palatable than a pure carbon tax, because of 
the  distaste  in  the  United  States for  increasing taxes  and  increasing motor  fuel  costs.  
Nonetheless, because the optimal revenue-neutral tax depends on prices and production levels, a 
fixed  tax  applied  over  long  periods  of  time  (as  is  often  necessary  for  political  expediency) 
reduces the efficacy outcomes.  Further, estimating life-cycle fuel carbon emissions is to date 
relatively  poorly  developed,  and  inaccuracies  in  this  process  can  reduce  the  economic 
effectiveness  of  both  standard  Pigouvian  taxes  and  revenue  neutral  taxes. Based  on  our 
simulations, however, administering such a policy could still increase social welfare over no 
policy at all.20
This paper presents a starting point on research in a relatively more politically feasible 
carbon  taxes.  Future  studies  can  easily  extend  the  model  to  fully  incorporate  technological 
dynamics  where  revenue  from  taxes  is used  to  internalize  spillover  externalities  during  the 
production of second generation biofuels. The model can also be used to calibrate for optimal 
levels  of  taxes,  technological  productivity  levels  and  carbon  coefficient  levels  over  time.
Alternatively, one can also modify the model to examine a price-neutral approach where there is 
no net motor fuel price change in response to a high-carbon tax and low-carbon subsidy. Lastly, 
the model can also be applied to regulating different types of pollutants.21
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Appendix 1 Deriving optimal tax rate with constrained tax revenues
From (6) we can solve for ,
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A similar expression for  is found for sector k. Equating the expressions for lambda together 
and solving for ti as a function of tk yields,
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Any change in output in sector i will affect taxes chosen by the government in sector i. This will 



























Fig. 2. Optimal Pollution Tax with Exogenously Determined Tax 
027
Tables
Table 1 Parameters used in the simulation























0.5 1 1 0.0077631670
Gasoline 10.75 1.789
Ethanol 10.21 1.363
Cellulosic ethanol 7.19 1.363
Biodiesel 6.13 3.44
a Prices are wholesale blendstock prices as of November 4, 2008 from
http://www.dtnethanolcenter.com/index.cfm?show=10&mid=38&pid=2. Emissions coefficients are taken from 
the same source. 
b Marginal damages are based on the average market price of $20/ton of carbon. There is 907.18 kilograms per ton 
and 3.785 kilograms per gallon. Using these conversion parameters, a $20/ton of carbon is similar to a 
$0.08345/gallon ($20/ton*ton/907.18kg*3.785 kg/gal). Assuming an emission coefficient for gasoline of 10.75 
kg/gal along with $0.08345/gallon, marginal damages would be equal to 0.0077utils/kg (0.08345/10.75).28
Table 2 Simulated Pollution Taxes  




























10% of Corn 
Ethanol
d
Diesel 0.088 0.018 0.027 -0.011 0.030 0.033
Gasoline 0.083 0.014 0.032 0.004 0.035 0.037
Ethanol 0.079 0.009 0.041 0.053 0.043 0.045
Cellulosic ethanol 0.056 -0.016 0.017 0.029 -0.010 -0.029
Biodiesel 0.048 -0.024 -0.054 -0.021 -0.048 -0.044
a Output prices based on parameters from Table 1. 
b Output prices for gasoline and diesel are increased to $4 and $5 per gallon, respectively.
c The emissions per gallon of cellulosic ethanol is lowered by half the current estimate from 7.19 to 3.595. Note that 
with this emissions coefficient, the unconstrained Pigouvian tax for Cellulosic ethanol is now $0.028/gallon.
d The emissions per gallon of cellulosic ethanol is lowered to 10% of ethanol to 1.021. Note that with this emissions 
coefficient, the unconstrained Pigouvian tax for Cellulosic ethanol is now $0.008/gallon.29
Table 3 Relative welfare under different emissions taxation regimes.
Type of tax Increase in social welfare 
(% of maximum change
form the first best optimal 
Pigouvian tax policy)
Unconstrained Pigouvian tax with baseline parameters  100.0%
No emissions tax 0.0%
Optimal revenue neutral tax with baseline parameters
a 89.0%
Revenue neutral tax based on relative emissions only
b 43.8%
Uncertainty in Parameters




Wrong fuel prices applied to revenue neutral tax
d 23.3%
Note:  The formula for the intermediate welfare percentage gains, Wi, is Wi=100*(Ui-Umin)/(Umax-Umin), 
where Ui, Umin and Umax are the utility derived from the intermediate policy case, unconstrained 
maximum Pigouvian tax  and no tax case, respectively.  
a Baseline parameters are taken from Table 1.
b Parameters are taken from Table 1 except all output are normalized to 1. 
c Parameters are taken from Table 1 except the emissions coefficient for cellulosic ethanol is 1.021.
d Parameters are taken from Table 1 except output prices for gasoline and diesel are $4 and $5 per gallon, 
respectively.